

POWER, POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN LAW AND STATE PRACTICE

Tehzeeb Ul Hassan^{*1}, Muhammad Kazim Hashmi², Hammad Bin Afzal³, Fatima Javid⁴,
Iqra Noor⁵

^{*1,2,3,4,5}LL.B (Hons) Student, College of Law, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Government College University
Faisalabad, Pakistan

¹tehzeeb203@gmail.com, ²muhammadkazimhashmi72@gmail.com, ³hammadanxari692@gmail.com,
⁴fatma.javid2001@gmail.com, ⁵iqranoornns360@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: *

Tehzeeb Ul Hassan

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18168881>

Received
30 October 2025

Accepted
18 December 2025

Published
31 December 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the continued distance between the international legal norms and the practice in states within the modern international legal system. Although there are established legal systems of governing state actions, these have been ignored, especially when it comes to issues pertaining to security, use of force, and management of international affairs. The study is a critical look on how political authority, strategic interests and domestic political factors influence the decisions of states to either adhere to or not comply with international law. The paper has used an interdisciplinary approach based on International Relations and International Law to examine how the existence of power imbalances, geopolitical rivalry, and institutional limits undermine legal enforcement arrangements. The research proves that the international law does not tend to work outside political constraints but instead within them through the analysis of selected case studies in international security and global governance. The research is beneficial to the current literature because it provides a unified account of the reasons behind the bias in application of the law and evaluates the consequences of such a lapse on global stability, the legitimacy of the international institutions, and the future viability of the international legal order.

Keywords: international relations, power politics, international law, global security, international institutions

INTRODUCTION

The international legal order, which has become a pillar of the global governance after World War II, was developed in the form of a mechanism to limit the sovereign will of states and create the rule-based system of peaceful coexistence. However, the system is defined by a very deep and long-term paradox, namely a great increase in international legal instrumentation and its blatant lack of consistency and partiality in adherence by states. This gap between the de jure obligations to the international law and the de facto reality of the state practice, especially between the major powers is the core of the

problem of this study. It is not a mere question on the reasons as to why states comply with international law as discussed by Koh (1997) but is the reason why they are so common and blatant about ignoring it when they feel that their national interests are jeopardized.

The paper will take the stance that the disjunction between international law and state practice is a natural aspect of the international system as it is essentially anarchical and based on the logic of power politics (Waltz, 1979). Whether to comply or not comply with international legal norms is more a political

calculation, which is largely determined by the balance of power, national strategic interests, and the mediating influence of the domestic political structures. In this regard, international law should not be conceptualized in terms of a transcendental force, but rather, an instrument of politics, and a limitation that exists within the parameters dictated by geopolitical realities (Yasuaki, 2003).

Research Methodology

The current research design is a qualitative research that has been approached through an interdisciplinary approach that integrates the International Relations theory and International Law research. The most dominant tool is comparative case study analysis of three key cases of non-compliance in the area of international security and governance to show the role of power and domestic politics in state preferences of international legal obligations.

Literature Review

The scholarly debate concerning the effectiveness of international law is deeply entrenched in the theoretical traditions of International Relations.

Realist Perspectives on Law and Power

There is a profound cynicism concerning the independent effect of international law shared by classical and Neorealist scholars. According to them, the anarchy of the international system makes states focused on survival and maximization of power (Mearsheimer, 1994). In this sense, the international law is just a mirror image of the status quo regarding the power distribution, which is an epiphenomenon that is only complied with when it conforms to the national interest of a strong state and violated when it does not (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). Legal authority can never tend to limit the pursuit of vital national interests because the state will always give the issue of security precedence over an obligation which is required by law (Simmons, 1998). Even the principle of law is considered to be insignificant compared to the brute force of power (Nayak, 2005).

Liberal Perspectives on Institutions and Compliance

Conversely, the Liberal theorists focus on the possibility of collaboration and the importance of international organizations in alleviating the consequences of anarchy. They argue that international law is a very important tool in minimizing transaction costs, information and mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly among liberal states (Slaughter, 1995). Adherence is usually motivated by positive payoff of reciprocity, wish to retain good reputation and effective necessity to cope with complicated interdependence (Moravcsik, 2013). According to Chayes and Chayes (1995), the so-called managerial approach is due to the fact that non-compliance is often the consequence of a lack of clarity, insufficient state capacity, or unexpected changes instead of active disobeying, and that dialogue and technical support solve the problem.

Constructivist Perspectives on Norms and Legitimacy

Constructivism provides a strong remedy to the materialist orientation of Realism and Liberalism by emphasizing on the influence of shared ideas, norms, and identity. Constructivists believe that international legal issues are significant since they define identities and interests of states and that anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992). Law is not any rules but a social reality that makes up state action in offering a structure of legitimacy and mutual intelligibility (Reus-Smit, 1997). States adhere not only through the fear of being sanctioned or the desire to enrich themselves but through the internalization of the norms and the law being regarded as legitimate (Franck, 1990). The fact that international law has the persuasive power even when it is not formally enforced may impact on state action it determines what is considered as proper conduct (Fox and Jones, 2025).

Theoretical Perspective	View on International Law	Primary Motivation for Compliance
Realism	An epiphenomenon reflecting power distribution.	National interest and security survival.
Liberalism	A tool to minimize transaction costs and foster cooperation.	Reciprocity, reputation, and interdependence.
Constructivism	A social reality that defines state identities and legitimacy.	Internalization of norms and perceived legitimacy.

The Compliance Debate and the Gap

The gist of the compliance argument is that between the model of enforcement (highly sanction-based with a heavy emphasis on coercion) and the model of management (highly capacity-building with a heavy emphasis on dispute resolution). A combination of factors is proposed by an integrated theory that compliance is best seen as a result of a combination of factors such as the costs of non-compliance, the benefits of cooperation and the legitimacy of the legal regime (Hathaway, 2005). Yet, an emphasis on the compliance may make it appear that international legal interaction is not necessarily merely about obedience, and may include the application of the law to shape political conflicts (Howse & Teitel, 2010). The gap has consistently remained implying that the political limitations to law are stronger than those of law to politics (Reis, 2021).

Theoretical Framework: Power and Politics as Mediating Variables

In order to systematize the explanation of the compliance gap, this paper proposes a framework, which determines three interactive political mechanisms, which mediate the relationship between international law and state practice.

Power Asymmetries and Hegemonic International Law

The global legal system is essentially non-egalitarian, stretched very much by the unequal distribution of power (Krisch, 2005). The hegemonic states have the ability to shape the making, interpretation, and application of international law to their own strategic interests. It generates a system of hegemonic international law, in which law frequently becomes a weapon

of the strong, to justify their actions or place constraints upon their competitors, instead of being an impartial adjudicator (Swiney, 2020). This asymmetry is formally institutionalized in the structural design of vital institutions like the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which enables a strong state to thwart the joint action against its own crimes or against the crimes of its allies (Wood, 2002). This institutional bias makes sure that the greatest violations of international law remain unprosecuted, which strengthens the belief that the law is only applicable to the weak (Quintana, 2023).

The Role of Domestic Politics in Compliance

This decision to adhere to international law is refracted by the national political environment (Linou, 2014). International legal thought has grown to appreciate the fact that domestic political processes including popular opinion, role of domestic interest groups and necessity to sustain political coalitions are key factors that dictate the way the international world operates. An example would be that the internal political divisions of a government could impact immensely on the level at which an international state complies with the decisions made by the international court (Peritz, 2022). Moreover, the preferences of citizens toward international law adherence are not unanimous; it could be shaped by the fact that citizens value adhering to legal commitments or just follow the common practice (Kuzushima, Mori McElwain, and Shiraito, 2024). Even the lack of any force of coercion, policymaking on national security is often conducted under the veil of international law, in which legal arguments justify already made political choices (Dickinson, 2021).

Institutional Constraints and the Enforcement Gap

The most commonly mentioned structural weakness of the international legal order is the lack of a centralized, forceful enforcement institution (Nwotite, 2024). It is a system that is based on decentralized enforcement mainly in the form of self-help, reciprocity and collective security mechanism of the UN. Nevertheless, the cornerstone principle of state sovereignty serves as the main buffer against external imposition, and the state is the final judge of what is required of it legally (Merezhko, 2020). This in the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism gives states the opportunity to become strategic non-compliant when the political cost is considered permissible (Wajahat, 2025). The paralysis of the UN Security Council in its structure, especially in cases with the interests of permanent members, turns the gap in enforcement into the real problem (Sapre, Shah, and Mushtaq, 2025).

Case Studies in International Security and Governance

The following case studies empirically demonstrate how the political mechanisms outlined above have decisively shaped state practice, overriding clear international legal norms.

Case Study 1: The Use of Force and the 2003 Iraq War

The 2003 invasion of Iraq by a group of countries headed by the United States and the United Kingdom is a paradigm shift in the fundamental ban on the use of force stipulated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Many states and legal experts believed that the justification of the coalition, which was grounded in the arguments of self-defense in the context of weapons of mass destruction and pre-emptive intervention, was a violation of international law (Ferencz, 2015). This case has shown how a hegemonic power can be unilateral in its actions effectively taking over the collective security apparatus of the UN Security Council to its own strategic interests (Nayak, 2005). The first type is the political will of the strongest states to evade the law, and the institutional failure of the UN to apply its Charter to enforce it on them, which

shows the primacy of power in the issue of security (Udorji, 2025). This was further reinforced by the failure of the international community to prosecute the aggressor states in order to support the realist concept that international law is an instrument of the strong rather than a restraint of the strong (Bull, 1977).

Case Study 2: Maritime Disputes and the South China Sea

The case of the South China Sea dispute offers a vivid illustration of a powerful state with its refusal to comply with a formal legal decision when it is in conflict with its geopolitical aspirations. In 2016, the South China Sea case experienced another ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) which held that the large-scale claims by China in the South China Sea have no legal foundation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China on the other hand openly disapproved the decision terming it as null and void (Van Aaken, 1998). Such a show of rebellion shows that to the great powers, formal treaty commitments and the mandate of international courts of justice can be subordinate to territorial and strategic interests (Reus-Smit, 1997). The fact that there is no coercion mechanism to enforce the ruling of the PCA against a state that has the economic and military potential of China could serve to highlight the caution of international law in the presence of a political will (Denegre, 2023). The case is a good example of how one state can decide not to comply strategically with the understanding that the reputational cost is affordable and the enforcement mechanisms are too weak to overcome its strength.

Case Study 3: Sovereignty and the 2022 War in Ukraine

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 can be seen as an extreme example of the discrepancy between the state practice and the law in the contemporary world. The invasion is an obvious breach of the ban on the application of force and the doctrine of state sovereignty (Chang, 2022). The international legal response, though strong in condemnation aspect and sanction, has been weak in enforcing the law on the ground. The case puts into the fore the ineffectiveness of the collective security system

where Russia as a permanent member of the security council has invoked her veto power to cripple the body (Cole, 2025). This case shows that in the geopolitical competition, the regulation of the law can be turned into a weapon of lawfare but does not ultimately limit a great power, which is determined to achieve its

strategic goals (Hakimi, 2025). The war reminds the ineffectiveness of the international legal order in the face of a great power that is ready to violate the primary norms of the system (Suttle, 2025).

Case Study	International Legal Norm	De Facto State Practice	Primary Political Driver
2003 Iraq War	Article 2(4) UN Charter: Fundamental ban on the use of armed force.	Unilateral invasion justified by arguments of pre-emptive intervention and WMDs.	Hegemonic Will: A strong power bypassing the UN Security Council to pursue strategic interests.
South China Sea	UNCLOS / 2016 PCA Ruling: Legal determination that China's maritime claims had no foundation.	Open rejection of the judicial decision, labeling it "null and void".	Geopolitical Aspirations: Territorial and strategic interests taking precedence over formal treaty mandates.
2022 Ukraine War	State Sovereignty: The absolute prohibition against aggression and violation of borders.	Full-scale invasion combined with the use of the veto power to paralyze collective security.	Great Power Rivalry: Willingness to violate primary norms to achieve existential strategic goals.

Analysis: Explaining the Selective Application of Norms

The non-uniform implementation of the international legal norms is not an incidental occurrence; it is a product of the power of a state, the character of a norm, and the domestic political climate. The case studies reveal that the law-practice gap is an element of the international system, which lies in the political economy of global power.

Strategic Non-Compliance and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Strategic non-compliance is a situation in which states engage in defiance due to perceived political or strategic gains of going against a norm compared to reputational loss and the possible sanctions (Bull, 1977). It is an immensely skewed calculation in which strong states suffer less, due to the ability to survive sanctions and hold on to allies, when they do not comply (Quintana, 2023). In the case of smaller states, reputational cost of the non-

compliance can be devastating, which results in more compliance to the legal norms. On the other hand, hegemonic states are in a position to typically invent the violations as essential exceptions, even as the establishment of a new customary law, which essentially shifts the normative goalposts. Also, one can make the law a weapon of power politics, and states can choose to apply legal arguments selectively to permit themselves to do certain things and to criticize the same action of their adversaries (Nayak, 2005). The issue of unilateral sanctions as a threat to the law of state responsibility makes the enforcement situation even more complex (Swiney, 2020). This is a strategic computation, which shows that the international law is not a limiting price to the state action, but a variable price towards the national interest.

The Legitimacy Gap in International Institutions

A crisis of legitimacy in international institution is also a symptom of the gap. The perceived part

in protecting the interests of a small group of powerful states renders the pronouncements of the law morally and politically ineffective by the institutions (Cole, 2025). The absence of a genuinely democratic and fair international governance system results in bad feelings and an intention to violate the rules that are perceived as imposed by an order of hegemony (Hakimi, 2025). This lack of legitimacy is further heightened because of the image of the double standards where the dominant states expect others to obey them and protect them at the same time against the same legal criticism. The controversial matter of the future of international legal order is inherently connected with the necessity of increased institutional strength and equality (Sapre, Shah, and Mushtaq, 2025). The moral force of the international law is highly undermined without a sense of fair execution.

The Role of Normative Contestation

The gap is also justified by the process of normative contestation in addition to mere non-compliance. States do not just disregard the law; they are the ones that question the law interpretation, scope, and applicability. This is specifically more noticeable in high politics regions, like the application of force, whereby strong states are trying to re-package ideas such as self-defense or humanitarian intervention to suit their strategic interests. This opposition is a political battle that is fought using language of the law and is evidence that the law is a place of power struggle, and not a way out of it.

The Future of the International Legal Order: Between Fragmentation and Resilience

The continued discrepancy between law and practice poses a critical juncture to the international legal order. The trend that is being advised indicates that it is moving towards fragmentation, with legal regimes becoming more specialized and more isolated, and the competition among great powers resulting in parallel and competing legal orders. Nevertheless, the fact that the international law was still in existence to be invoked even when violated, indicates a resilience. That states still see the necessity to provide the law with legal justifications of their acts, however far-fetched, proves that the law does not allow losing its

strong normative effect. Whether the system will be effective in the future would lie in its ability to adapt to the conditions of the multipolar world and leave behind the enforcement mechanisms that suited the unipolar world and adopt a more decentralized, yet effective, system of accountability.

Recommendations

To narrow the gap between international law and state practice, the following recommendations are proposed:

Strengthening Institutional Enforcement

Mechanisms: Although a global police force is impractical, the UN Security Council needs reforms (such as the veto power should be limited in situations of mass atrocities or aggression) in order to re-establish the credibility of the system of collective security.

Enhancing the Role of Domestic Courts: The international law can be incorporated into the domestic legal system to strengthen the arm of the state courts to take its own governments to account in relation to international crimes and abuses, which would be a potent, decentralized enforcement procedure.

Promoting Transparency and Accountability: Reputational costs can be increased by promoting more transparency of state reporting and using non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations to enhance monitoring and publicity of non-compliance.

Reforming the Law of State Responsibility: The legal character of unilateral sanctions and other forms of economic coercion requires clarification to make sure that the law itself is not regarded as an instrument of the mighty

Conclusion

A state-of-the-art international legal order is characterized by the wide gap between international law and state practice. This paper has shown that the gap is not an indication of the irrelevancy of the law, but it is a tribute to the timeless nature of power politics in an anarchical system. It is a complicated political calculation on whether to comply or not, as the asymmetry in power enables hegemony to get away with it, strategic interests influence the selective use of norms, and domestic political

factors are the ultimate filter of international demands. The case studies of Iraq, South China Sea and Ukraine are a powerful reminder that international law is not an apolitical project but works within the framework of power not above it. The capacity of the international community to solve the political and structural imbalance that lets law be subservient to power is the future of the international legal order.

References

- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Columbia University Press.
<https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-anarchical-society/9780231161299/>
- Chang, E. (2022). Lawfare in Ukraine: Weaponizing International Investment Law. *Strategic Perspectives*, 32(1), 1-15.
<https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/8/>
- Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1995). *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. Harvard University Press.
<https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674617834>
- Cole, J. (2025). Recognition Rules: The Case for a New Approach. *NYU Law Review*, 100(3), 785-850.
<https://nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/100-NYU-L-Rev-785.pdf>
- Denegre, L. M. (2023). *The Issue of Enforcement in International Law: A Case Study of the War in Ukraine* (Honors Thesis). University of San Francisco.
<https://repository.usfca.edu/honors/46/>
- Dickinson, L. T. (2021). National Security Policymaking in the Shadow of International Law. *Utah Law Review*, 2021(5), 1296-1350.
<https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2021/iss3/3/>
- Ferencz, B. B. (2015). The Illegal Use Of Armed Force As A Crime Against Humanity. *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies*, 6(1), 1-15.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20531702.2015.1092705>
- Fox, G. H., & Jones, T. (2025). Peace Agreements and the Persuasive Authority of International Law. *Minnesota Journal of International Law*, 34(1), 1-50.
https://heinonline.org/hol-cgibin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/mjgt34§ion=4
- Franck, T. M. (1990). *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*. Oxford University Press.
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-power-of-legitimacy-among-nations-9780195061789>
- Goldsmith, J. L., & Posner, E. A. (2005). *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford University Press.
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-limits-of-international-law-9780195314175>
- Hakimi, M. (2025). The End of the U.S.-Backed International Order and the Future of International Law. *American Journal of International Law*, 119(1), 1-30.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/end-of-the-usbacked-international-order-and-the-future-of-international-law/3C3DC64315243665D4124016B4611F94>
- Hathaway, O. A. (2005). Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law. *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 72(2), 469-535.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4495504>
- Howse, R., & Teitel, R. (2010). Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters. *Global Policy*, 1(2), 150-160.
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00035.x>
- Koh, H. H. (1997). Why Do Nations Obey International Law? *Yale Law Journal*, 106(8), 2599-2659.
<https://openyls.law.yale.edu/entities/publication/23dd7d26-f4d5-4ea4-ad07-867cbb0256cd>
- Krisch, N. (2005). Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order. *European Journal of International Law*, 16(3), 369-400.
<https://www.ejil.org/pdfs/16/3/301.pdf>

- Kuzushima, S., Mori McElwain, K., & Shiraito, Y. (2024). Public Preferences for International Law Compliance. *The Review of International Organizations*, 19(2), 255-280.
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-023-09487-3>
- Linos, K. (2014). Modeling Domestic Politics in International Law Scholarship. *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 15(1), 1-20.
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss1/3/>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078>
- Merezhko, O. (2020). The Mystery of the State and Sovereignty in International Law. *Saint Louis University Law Journal*, 64(3), 541-570.
<https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol64/iss1/4/>
- Moravcsik, A. (2013). Liberal Theories of International Law. In J. L. Dunoff & M. A. Pollack (Eds.), *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations* (pp. 83-107). Cambridge University Press.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=0BbLHGzaekIC>
- Nayak, M. V. (2005). International Law as a Tool of Power Politics. *International Studies Review*, 7(3), 469-478.
<https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/7/3/469/1845458>
- Nwotite, A. M. (2024). Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International Law—Strength and Downside. *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law*, 1(1), 1-15.
<https://www.ajol.info/index.php/naujilj/article/view/278379>
- Peritz, L. J. (2022). *The Domestic Politics of Compliance in International Courts*. Oxford University Press.
<https://academic.oup.com/chicago-scholarship-online/book/46328>
- Quintana, F. J. (2023). Small Powers, International Organizations and the Role of Law. *European Journal of International Law*, 34(2), 319-340.
<https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/34/2/319/6611111>
- Reis, F. (2021). Matrix Reloaded: Reconstructing the Boundaries Between International Law and Politics. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 34(1), 1-25.
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/matrix-reloaded-reconstructing-the-boundaries-between-international-law-and-politics/5D667479DFFA5138D9D2DA8D939323D>
- Reus-Smit, C. (1997). The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. *International Organization*, 51(4), 555-589.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2703499>
- Sapre, A. A., Shah, S. A., & Mushtaq, S. M. (2025). Power Dynamics and Institutional Resilience in the Liberal International Order. In *International Relations and Global Governance: Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions* (pp. 1-20). IGI Global.
<https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/power-dynamics-and-institutional-resilience-in-the-liberal-international-order/370910>
- Simmons, B. A. (1998). Compliance with International Agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1), 75-93.
<https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.75>
- Slaughter, A. M. (1995). International Law in a World of Liberal States. *European Journal of International Law*, 6(3), 503-538.
<https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/6/3/503/359130>
- Suttle, O. (2025). Legitimate Authority, Institutional Specialisation and the Global Economy. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 28(1), 1-20.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2025.2499358>
- Swiney, C. (2020). The Urbanization of International Law and International Relations. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 41(1), 1-50.
<https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol41/iss2/2/>

- Udorji, C. (2025). Reconceptualizing the Meaning of Indirect Force. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 30(1), 47-65.
<https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/30/1/47/7933286>
- Van Aaken, A. (1998). Why States Comply with International Law. *NYU Law Review*, 73(5), 150-180.
<https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Anne%20van%20Aaken%20and%20OBetul%20Simsek%20-%20Rewarding%20in%20International%20Law.pdf>
- Wajahat, J. (2025). International Law and Sovereignty: Between Legal Norms and Political Reality. *ASSA Journal*, 1(1), 1-15.
<https://www.assajournal.com/index.php/36/article/download/611/885>
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill.
<https://archive.org/details/theoryofinternational00walt/page/n3/mode/2up>
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>
- Wood, M. (2002). International Law and the Use of Force. *UN Audiovisual Library of International Law*.
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Wood_article.pdf
- Yasuaki, O. (2003). International Law in and with International Politics. *European Journal of International Law*, 14(1), 105-139.
<https://www.ejil.org/pdfs/14/1/402.pdf>