

INSINUATION OF HUMANITARIAN FALLOUT OF US-VENEZUELA CONFLICT:

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ABSTRACT

In pursuance of new World Order, the U.S. military actions in Venezuela have drawn renewed attention to the widespread humanitarian impact of such like asymmetric warfare by defying the tenets of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The U.S. rationale grounded in the Monroe Doctrine has prompted the question about the legitimacy of unilateral action amid the intensifying great power contestation and the status of existing (IHL). This article delves into the humanitarian repercussions of the conflict and explore how far the contribution of IHL and Geneva Conventions may be effective in advancing the adherence to Laws of Armed Conflict and its impact on US-Venezuela Conflict. This paper further evaluates the efficiency of Geneva Conventions its influence in enhancing compliance of humanitarian standards in such like warfare and operationalization of IHL principles.

Keywords: Geneva Call, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Asymmetrical warfare, Deed of Commitment, Child Protection, Compliance Mechanisms, Humanitarian Norms, Conflict Resolution. ICRC

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. has long viewed Venezuela as geopolitically valuable due to its enormous crude oil deposits and its position as an access point to the South American continent. Estimates from Venezuelan government indicate more than 100 civilian fatalities, with the displacement affecting thousands. The invasion has further deepened the country's economic turmoil, intensifying the scarcity of food, medicines and fuel.

The nature of armed conflict has undergone a profound transformation in the post-Cold War era. Traditional inter-state wars have increasingly been replaced by internal armed conflicts characterized by asymmetrical power relations between state armed forces and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The participation of asymmetrical warfare in the global sphere has been thoroughly investigated, particularly in the domains of international law and political

science. In recent years, the international community has increasingly recognized the importance of addressing the behavior of these groups, especially in the context of asymmetrical warfare. Asymmetrical warfare refers to armed conflict between parties with markedly unequal military capabilities, resources, and legal status. Typically, such conflicts involve a state military confronting NSAGs that rely on guerrilla tactics, insurgency, and unconventional methods of warfare. These conflicts are often protracted and fought within civilian populations, increasing the likelihood of incidental civilian harm.

Conversations regarding enhancing asymmetrical warfare compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) have become more prominent, as this legal structure encounters many significant challenges. As highlighted by the President of the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the 2016 Istanbul World Humanitarian Summit, this period may be remembered for the extensive suffering experienced by civilians—deliberate assaults, the devastation of homes, schools, and hospitals, and the large-scale displacement of communities. Several elements affect asymmetrical warfare's regard for IHL. A lack of understanding, an absence of motivations to adhere, and intentional violations of international responsibilities all lead to breach of IHL. As Krieger pointed out, decisions regarding compliance emerge from intricate motivations shaped by power dynamics, historical and socio-political circumstances, and context-dependent elements. The composition of asymmetrical warfare's significantly influences their adherence; an organized faction with centralized leadership might enforce rules differently than a loosely connected, decentralized group. Furthermore, an asymmetrical warfare engaged in a peace initiative may interpret IHL distinctively compared to one focused on asserting control over civilians or showcasing military strength. Similar to states in international asymmetrical warfare, Asymmetrical warfare often evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of compliance based on their objectives and the current situation. Nonetheless, the state-centric framework of international law presents challenges that may diminish asymmetrical warfare's adherence to humanitarian principles. Three primary challenges occur: (i) international agreements mainly engage states, (ii) despite being obligated by IHL, Asymmetrical warfare is unable to formally negotiate or become signatories to these agreements, and (iii) states often overlook asymmetrical warfare's viewpoints on humanitarian principles, hindering their motivation to comply. Some non-state armed groups perceive international law as preferential toward states, which further diminishes their sense of responsibility toward these principles.

Given the nature of asymmetrical warfare and the constraints of state-centered legal systems, specialized approaches have been developed to enhance asymmetrical warfare's adherence to IHL. Certain non-state entities, including humanitarian organizations, have played a key role in this initiative. The ICRC, as an

exceptionally positioned international body, has been actively involved with asymmetrical warfare's to carry out its mandate for an extended period. Notably, as early as 1871, founder Henry Dunant of the ICRC negotiated with the leaders of the Paris Commune to secure the release of hostages. Over the past two decades, human rights organizations, which historically concentrated on state actors, have also started to keenly monitor the violations by asymmetrical warfare and push for their adherence with international standards. These organizations employ a variety of methods—including dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, training, and capacity building initiatives—to effectuate changes in asymmetrical warfare's conduct. Often, these strategies are blended according to the specific mandate and operational methods of each organization.

Geneva Call, a humanitarian NGO founded in 2000 by members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), operates within this framework, acknowledging asymmetrical warfare as key actors in addressing IHL-related issues. By 2018, Geneva Call had interacted with approximately 120 asymmetrical warfare on various humanitarian concerns. This chapter describes Geneva Call's strategies for promoting compliance with humanitarian norms among non-state armed actors. It explores the organization's methods of engagement, successes, and challenges, with an emphasis on child protection within NIACs.

The function of Geneva Call is significant in applying humanitarian regulations during asymmetrical warfare and for ensuring that Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) follow International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In light of the difficulties presented by the state-centric framework of international law, Geneva Call utilizes innovative strategies like the Deed of Commitment to close the divide between international legal requirements and ANSA adherence. This study investigates Geneva Call's engagement model, including direct negotiations, third-party mediation, and voluntary commitments from ANSAs. The research also examines the organization's monitoring systems and its influence on child protection, health care accessibility, and the ban on anti-personnel mines. Despite significant achievements, challenges still exist in securing

ongoing compliance. This paper evaluates the efficiency of Geneva Call's method, its contribution in enhancing humanitarian standards in asymmetrical warfare and operationalization of IHL principles.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.

This research article endeavors to suggest that the Geneva Conventions must be revised keeping in view the current world order so as to neutralize the collateral damage of humanity. The present strike by the US has ignited the grave breaches of IHL as well as international Law. So on the basis of humanitarian considerations it is important to clarify the objective of Geneva Conventions in encouraging adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to both the U.S. and Venezuela for their allegiance to commit to an immediate ceasefire and pursue the diplomatic negotiations to settle their dispute peacefully. This paper will endeavor to insinuate the international community to strengthen humanitarian assistance and demand accountability for breaches of humanitarian law, and Geneva Conventions ongoing work to promote compliance with humanitarian law and support local authorities and civil society should be upheld and expanded among asymmetrical warfare, an essential component of alleviating civilian hardship in asymmetrical warfare. Considering the US-Venezuela nature of contemporary armed conflicts involving hostilities between state armed forces and non-state armed groups, comprehending how Geneva Call interacts with them via mechanisms such as the Deed of Commitment is crucial for promoting humanitarian values. The research also highlights the difficulties and achievements of Geneva Call's efforts, providing important insights for policy-makers, humanitarian entities, and legal academics regarding innovative methods to improve asymmetrical warfare's accountability. By exploring the practical consequences of Geneva Call's activities, the research contributes to the broader discussion on enhancing IHL adherence beyond state entities, ultimately supporting more effective humanitarian responses in conflict areas.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.

This research adopts a Doctrinal Research approach as it analyses the existing statutory law of IHL and theorize the area of armed conflict which has to be revisit in order to curtail the unnecessary suffering as well as to include provision for punitive measures against the defiant state such as US in this particular case. by going through both primary and secondary resources. Primary data consists of Geneva Conventions and its optional protocols field evaluations, and case studies of asymmetrical warfare Us-Venezuela that have signed the Deed of Commitment. Secondary resources include scholarly articles, policy documents, and reports from international entities such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations.

The study applies content analysis to examine Geneva Call's engagement strategies, compliance frameworks, and obstacles. In addition, comparative analysis is utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of Geneva Call's efforts across various conflict regions. The research seeks to deliver a thorough assessment of Geneva Call's contribution to advancing humanitarian standards and its effectiveness in encouraging asymmetrical warfare adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

U.S. Policy towards Venezuela.

Speaking overtly, there has always been a concern of U.S. think tanks and Affiliates of Congress towards the worsening condition of human rights and autonomous circumstances in Venezuela and the dearth of government's collaboration on the vices of antidrug and counterterrorism struggles. After the failure of the dialogues of government-opposition, the establishment levied visa constraints and sanctions of asset-blocking on officers of Venezuela who are tangled in human rights exploitations. But covertly the US is not happy with the China and Russia increasing influence in soil of Venezuela which is causing a great concern for them. In order to intact its hegemony and changing the World Order of a unipolar world US took the Venezuela by violating the International Humanitarian Law and Geneva Conventions.

IHL AND GENEVA CONVENTION'S APPROACH.

As an international humanitarian organization, Geneva Conventions has been actively emphasizing adherence to international humanitarian law during the conflict, calling for an immediate ceasefire, civilian protection, and upholding the humanitarian principles. Through training programs and assistance, Geneva Call has played a role to strengthen the capacity of Venezuelan authorities and civil society organizations aimed at improving humanitarian response efforts.

Geneva Call, a humanitarian NGO based in Switzerland, plays an essential role in addressing the obligations of asymmetrical warfare within the context of international law, especially regarding International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Since the 1990s, NGOs have risen to prominence in influencing international legal standards, contributing to both hard and soft law through treaty negotiations, interpretation, and enforcement. As Bennoune remarks, NGOs have also taken on roles historically associated with states, such as delivering vital public services like healthcare and education. In situations of asymmetrical warfare, NGOs are actively involved in the conduct of warring parties, alleviating the deficiencies in the enforcement mechanisms of the international legal system. Geneva Call was formed after members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) realized that the worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines would not be effective unless asymmetrical warfare also pledged to cease their use.

Given that the 1997 Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines legally binds only states, Geneva Call created an innovative solution: the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action. This mechanism offers ANSAs a way to voluntarily commit to the fundamental principles of the treaty, thus addressing its limited personal scope. By allowing asymmetrical warfare to officially pledge adherence, the initiative promotes a sense of ownership and responsibility over the humanitarian commitments they assume. Geneva Call's wider mission is to improve compliance with IHL by obtaining asymmetrical warfare's agreement and commitment to its

principles. Geneva Call adopts a pragmatic approach centered on dialogue, training, and voluntary commitments.

While originally concentrating on prohibiting anti-personnel mines, Geneva Call has since broadened its efforts to tackle a variety of humanitarian issues, including child protection, the prohibition of sexual violence and gender discrimination, the preservation of cultural heritage, the prevention of forced displacement, and the assurance of healthcare access. Schneckener and Hofmann highlight that addressing particular humanitarian matters separately enhances engagement with armed groups, as it streamlines negotiations in comparison to complicated peace processes. This thematic strategy also aids Geneva Call's monitoring initiatives.

In addition to the Deed of Commitment, Geneva Call offers asymmetrical warfare training on IHL and practical advice on its application. This is a crucial component of engagement, as asymmetrical warfare members typically lack formal education in IHL and possess only a basic understanding of its principles, such as civilian protection. Frequently, new recruits are deployed directly into combat with minimal comprehension of legal responsibilities. By instructing asymmetrical warfare on IHL, Geneva Call seeks to enhance their compliance with humanitarian regulations, ultimately promoting increased respect for international law in situations of conflict.

HUMANITARIAN FALLOUT OF US-VENEZUELA CONFLICT:

This conflict illustrates the inherent difficulties of enforcing the humanitarian law in asymmetric warfare. The unconventional U.S. tactics, including cyber warfare and special forces operations, have intensified concerns regarding civilian safety and upholding the principles of distinction and proportionality.

Geneva Call connects with asymmetrical warfare through three main approaches. The first approach is direct engagement, evidenced by its dealings with groups such as the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The second approach entails third-party mediation, where local

NGOs, civil society organizations, or even other ANSAs help facilitate communication. This strategy was applied with the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal and the Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU)-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) in Burundi. Support from diaspora members, religious or community leaders, and other humanitarian agents has been essential as well. Finally, some ANSAs reach out to Geneva Call on their own after recognizing its work, as happened with the Chin National Front (CNF) in Burma/Myanmar.

Before starting a conversation with an asymmetrical warfare, Geneva Call conduct the thorough assessment of the dynamics of the conflict and the internal structure of the group. This involves evaluating its goals, leadership framework, operational setup, support networks, and its position on International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Following this assessment, Geneva Call formulates specific arguments to persuade the group to adhere to humanitarian standards. As Former ICRC advisor Banterer points out that a misunderstanding of an armed group's organization, cultural background, conflict dynamics, or the legal consequences of military actions can quickly damage credibility. Without this initial evaluation, Geneva Call would find it challenging to influence asymmetrical warfare to comply with IHL. In order to promote behavioral change in effective manner, NGOs or other negotiators must develop a well-informed viewpoint and exhibit expertise on the relevant circumstances.

Before initiating dialogue with a non-state armed group, Geneva Call considers two key criteria. The first criterion is the presence of an organized armed group that is either actively involved in military actions or possesses the capability to do so. This requires a well-defined command structure, controlled access to arms, the ability to recruit and train combatants, and the operational capacity to conduct the military activities. A well-defined organizational hierarchy is critical for ensuring that commitments made to Geneva Call are communicated as binding orders, with mechanism in place to prevent violations and enforce disciplinary measures when breaches happen. In addition, a stable command

structure facilitates ongoing humanitarian discussions, while groups facing internal fragmentation or lacking organizational unity may be difficult to engage with.

Two additional points deserve attention. Firstly, although Geneva Call has traditionally worked mainly with politically motivated asymmetrical warfare as opposed to those motivated by profit, contemporary conflicts often confuse these categories. Since IHL is applicable to all participants in an asymmetrical warfare regardless of their motivations, Geneva Call is willing to engage with any asymmetrical warfare that satisfies its criteria. However, its emphasis continues to be on politically oriented organizations, especially those affecting civilian populations. Secondly, Geneva Call does not view the intensity of the conflict or the extent of the territorial control of an asymmetrical warfare as key factors in assessing whether engagement is appropriate.

Once initial contact is established through any of the previously mentioned methods, Geneva Call aims to promote an open humanitarian dialogue with the asymmetrical warfare. The aim is to comprehend the difficulties the group faces in following humanitarian norms and to customize strategies that improve compliance with IHL. The approach employed differs according to the group's situation. For instance, a group that is actively recruiting and utilizing child soldiers would require a distinct intervention compared to one that lacks the necessary infrastructure to implement age verification mechanisms but does not intentionally breach child protection norms. Moreover, not every asymmetrical warfare needs to be engaged on all humanitarian issues. For example, a group that does not use anti-personnel mines may not see relevancy of training regarding their prohibition. The extent and character of Geneva Call's engagement are thus determined based on its initial evaluation of the actions and requirements.

Implications for Regional Stability:

The conflict poses serious risks to regional stability, with the potential to extend beyond the national borders. The invasion has also spurred the other nations to adopt more assertive foreign policies, undermining the role of regional bodies like the Organization of American States (OAS)

and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Geneva Call has created four Deeds of Commitment to involve asymmetrical warfare in upholding humanitarian standards. Alongside the original Deed prohibiting anti-personnel mines, the organization launched the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of asymmetrical warfare in 2010, the Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of asymmetrical warfare and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination in 2012, and the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Health Care in asymmetrical warfare in 2018. Asymmetrical warfare can sign these Deeds if they fulfill certain requirements, which include having a distinct leadership structure, the ability to apply core provisions, and allowing Geneva Call to oversee adherence. These Deeds are executed by asymmetrical warfare leaders, co-signed by Geneva Call, and formally acknowledged by the Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva. The signing events frequently occur in the historic Alabama Room at Geneva's City Hall, emphasizing their importance. Asymmetrical warfare might opt to sign these Deeds to achieve political endorsement, declare their dedication to humanitarian standards, and enhance their international legitimacy. In certain instances, commitments made by asymmetrical warfare have swayed state actions, exemplified by Sudan's ratification of the Ottawa Convention after the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (SPLM/A) signing of the relevant Deed in 2001. Likewise, when South Sudan attained independence in 2011, its inaugural humanitarian treaty was the Ottawa Convention, showcasing the enduring influence of asymmetrical warfare engagement in Geneva Call's programs.

Although Deeds of Commitment are not treaties under international law, they constitute soft-law instruments that generate normative expectations and moral obligations. From a doctrinal perspective, they represent an innovative attempt to extend humanitarian norms to actors traditionally excluded from formal treaty processes.

The Deeds of Commitment correspond with international standards and impose both

negative and positive responsibilities. For instance, the Deed for the Protection of Children forbids their involvement in hostilities and guarantees they are not recruited into military forces, defining children as individuals under 18. It also features provisions for delivering aid, healthcare, and education in regions overseen by asymmetrical warfare. Similarly, the Deed for the Protection of Health Care requires asymmetrical warfare not to assault medical staff or facilities and to ensure access to healthcare services without bias. Geneva Call's method promotes peer influence among asymmetrical warfare, as signatory factions encourage others to pledge to these Deeds. This has been evident in numerous conflicts, such as in Myanmar, India, and Somalia, where organizations motivated their peers to embrace similar pledges. Geneva Call organizes meetings where armed factions address legal issues, execution plans, and humanitarian matters. A significant instance was a 2016 assembly in Geneva, where 21 armed groups from 11 nations gathered to enhance child protection and education in areas of conflict. Although the Deeds do not outline formal timelines for compliance, Geneva Call partners with Asymmetrical warfare through action plans to ensure enforcement via internal directives, training, and oversight, thereby bolstering adherence to humanitarian principles.

Recommendations.

Both the U.S. and Venezuela should commit to an immediate ceasefire and pursue the diplomatic negotiations to settle their dispute peacefully. The international community must reinforce humanitarian assistance and demand accountability for breaches of humanitarian law. IHL and Geneva Convention's ongoing work to promote compliance with humanitarian law and support local authorities and civil society should be upheld and expanded. By making humanitarian law and civilian protection central to responses, the humanitarian impact of asymmetric conflict can be mitigated strengthening the regional stability. Geneva Call's Deeds of Commitment contain a standard provision for monitoring, which requires signatory asymmetrical warfare to permit and assist in monitoring and verification activities. This encompasses visits, inspections,

and furnishing necessary information and reports to Geneva Call and other independent entities. Monitoring occurs at three distinct levels. Initially, Asymmetrical warfare are mandated to submit reports that outline their implementation actions and obstacles, designating focal persons to enhance communication. Although no specific reporting procedure is outlined, groups have delivered updates through written correspondence, oral communication, and meetings. Next, Geneva Call assesses third-party information from various sources, including States, UN agencies, NGOs, local communities, and media. Lastly, Geneva Call undertakes its own field missions, whether as routine follow-ups or verification endeavors responding to serious breaches, as illustrated by the situation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Since signatory groups accept these visits upon signing the Deed, Geneva Call does not need additional consent for its missions. Over time, its monitoring capabilities have bolstered through a more enduring presence in nations such as Iraq, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Notably, Geneva Call's experience counters the prevalent notion that Asymmetrical warfare resist external oversight almost all signatories have complied with monitoring obligations, submitted reports, and permitted follow-up missions even amid allegations of violations.

The Deeds also grant Geneva Call the authority to publicize cases of both compliance and non-compliance. This public disclosure can be advantageous for asymmetrical warfare pursuing political legitimacy and acceptance within the international community by illustrating their dedication to humanitarian standards. For instance, in May 2018, Geneva Call reported the destruction of 2,500 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Western Sahara, fulfilling a promise made by the Polisario Front when it entered into the Deed prohibiting such weapons in 2005. Conversely, Geneva Call's monitoring also reveals infractions. A 2017 field visit to Syria discovered that the YPG/YPJ and the Democratic Self-Administration in Rojava, signatories of the Deed for the Protection of Children since 2014, had participated in child recruitment. In reply, the group acknowledged its accountability and detailed corrective

measures, including enhanced internal investigations and an official circular to all units reiterating their child protection policies. This openness in compliance and responsibility bolsters Geneva Call's credibility and reinforces humanitarian commitments among asymmetrical warfare.

By publicizing commitments and monitoring adherence, Geneva Call introduces a form of indirect accountability that can influence operational behavior and contribute to the reduction of indiscriminate violence.

Since its establishment in 2000, Geneva Call has played a key role in engaging with asymmetrical warfare worldwide, especially in fostering compliance with humanitarian standards and safeguarding civilian populations from the horrific effects of warfare. Over the years, Geneva Call has collaborated with over 120 asymmetrical warfare participants, with 64 of these groups signing one or more Deeds of Commitment by 2019. This engagement has led to concrete results, including the disarmament of child soldiers, the elimination of anti-personnel mines, and enhanced humanitarian collaboration in areas of conflict. The organization's initiatives have also facilitated aid programs by specialized humanitarian groups, ensuring that those affected receive the necessary assistance. Geneva Call's involvement has resulted in numerous positive results. Numerous armed factions have made tangible efforts to fulfill their pledges, including ending the recruitment of child soldiers, stopping gender-based violence, and reducing the deployment of landmines. In certain cases, their commitments have developed wider humanitarian collaboration, even in the most difficult conflict scenarios. For example, in specific war-torn areas, Geneva Call has coordinated demining operations, enabling communities to reconstruct their lives without the persistent threat of landmines. Moreover, Geneva Call's involvement has affected armed groups that have not officially signed Deeds of Commitment but have adopted similar humanitarian principles. This illustrates the organization's wider influence that goes beyond formal agreements, swaying armed actors through advocacy, negotiation, and practical humanitarian efforts. Despite its achievements, Geneva Call encounters considerable

challenges. Some armed groups completely reject international humanitarian law, citing ideological, military, or strategic motivations. Furthermore, the fragmentation of armed groups, where a single entity divides into multiple factions that operate independently, makes it more difficult to ensure long-term adherence to commitments. Groups with decentralized structures, such as the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), occasionally find it challenging to uphold humanitarian standards consistently across their various units.

Another major challenge for Geneva Call is gaining access to conflict zones. In specific areas, security concerns, restrictions imposed by governments, and limitations on travel impede Geneva Call's ability to interact directly with armed groups. Some nations have even made dialogue with armed groups they label as 'terrorist organizations' illegal, complicating humanitarian efforts even further. Nevertheless, there are instances where governments have collaborated with Geneva Call, recognizing the importance of its efforts in developing stability and decreasing harm to civilians. Geneva Call's experiences highlight a major transformation in international law which increasingly recognizes the influence of non-State actors in shaping humanitarian outcomes. The conventional perspective that international law applies exclusively to State actors is increasingly being contested by the realities of contemporary warfare, where non-State armed groups frequently play vital roles. Through negotiations, dialogue, and agreements, Geneva Call has shown that it is not only feasible but crucial to engage these actors for the successful application of humanitarian norms. This shifting reality cannot be overlooked. The involvement of armed groups in humanitarian dialogues signifies an essential move toward alleviating civilian suffering, reducing war's effects, and promoting accountability in conflict zones. Geneva Call's strategy, which focuses on constructive engagement instead of isolation, provides a valuable model for future humanitarian efforts aimed at bridging the divide between international law and the complex realities of asymmetrical warfare.

The significance of Geneva Call in addressing Asymmetrical warfare cannot be overstated. By

collaborating directly with armed groups, the organization has played a role in protecting civilians, reducing violations of humanitarian law, and establishing humanitarian commitments even in the most difficult conflict settings. While major challenges persist, Geneva Call's efforts have illustrated that engagement, dialogue, and constructive negotiations with armed groups can result in meaningful humanitarian results. As international law keeps evolving, Geneva Call's approach is likely to remain an essential instrument in tackling the complex humanitarian challenges presented by asymmetrical warfare globally.

CONCLUSION.

The US-Venezuela conflict underscores the profound humanitarian challenges associated with the asymmetric warfare. At the time when the world is confronting with the dynamics of great-power rivalry, upholding humanitarian law and ensuring civilian safety must remain priorities. The contribution of the instruments of IHL such as Geneva Conventions and Optional Protocols in encouraging the respect for humanitarian norms is vital and demands broad backing from nations and international institutions. Revision in Geneva Conventions must enable both the U.S. and Venezuela should commit to an immediate ceasefire and pursue the diplomatic negotiations to settle their dispute peacefully. The international community must reinforce humanitarian assistance and demand accountability for breaches of humanitarian law. Geneva Convention's ongoing work to promote compliance with humanitarian law and support local authorities and civil society should be upheld and expansion of Geneva Conventions play a vital role in improving the voluntary compliance of asymmetrical warfare with IHL and in minimizing the collateral damage through innovative approaches like the Deed of Commitment. By involving asymmetrical warfare through direct discussions, third-party mediation, and awareness-raising initiatives, promoting awareness, internalization Geneva Call has made significant advancements in humanitarian compliance. The organization's influence is clear in its initiatives to prohibit anti-personnel mines, protect children in asymmetrical warfare, and guarantee access to

health care. However, challenges such as fragmented command structures, inconsistent commitments, and political complexities remain. In spite of these obstacles, Geneva Call's engagement methods have shown that asymmetrical warfare can be encouraged to adopt and uphold humanitarian principles, thus enhancing civilian protection in conflict areas. Future initiatives should aim at strengthening monitoring mechanisms and expanding collaboration with other humanitarian organizations to improve sustainability of compliance.

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Venezuelan government has made it difficult for Venezuelans to obtain a valid passport and therefore legal status outside the country. U.N. Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, Response for Venezuelans (RV4), "Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2020," as of July 5, 2020.

