FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION: EVALUATING PAKISTAN’S EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

Abstract

The Eighteenth Amendment, passed in 2010, represents the most far-reaching constitutional reforms in Pakistan since 1973. It abolished the Concurrent Legislative List, devolved numerous subjects and ministries to provinces, and curtailed presidential prerogatives, thereby redefining the legal framework of federal-provincial relations. This critical review synthesizes primary legal texts, implementation assessments, and peer-reviewed and policy literature to evaluate both the amendment’s legal architecture and its governance outcomes. While the amendment reallocated formal authority to provinces and opened institutional pathways for cooperative federalism, its practical impact has been uneven. The provinces received expanded responsibilities without fully matched fiscal transfers, and administrative and legislative implementation gaps limited service-delivery improvements in several devolved sectors. The paper argues that legal devolution outpaced the transfer of resources and capacity, producing asymmetric outcomes across provinces and policy areas. Building on government documents, World Bank and UNDP evaluations, and Pakistan-based policy analyses, the review concludes with focused recommendations to strengthen the National Finance Commission process, harmonize residual competences, and institutionalize intergovernmental dispute-resolution mechanisms to make provincial autonomy operational