GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Keywords:
International Investment Law, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), International Investment Arbitration, Geopolitical Conflicts, ICSID Arbitration, UNCITRAL ArbitrationAbstract
The theoretical framework of this research was based on the effects of geopolitical conflicts on international investment arbitration and on the efficiency of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in resolving investment disputes in such conflicts. The problems this study addressed were the effects of wars, economic sanctions, territorial conflicts, and political instability on foreign investment and on the effectiveness of currently active international arbitration mechanisms. The study also examined the role of major arbitration forums, such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in resolving disputes arising from a geopolitical crisis. This research method was a qualitative doctrinal approach and comparative institutional analysis. There was a comprehensive study of both legal primary and secondary sources, including arbitration awards, bilateral investment treaties, institutional rules, scholarly works, and policy reports. A number of cases involving economic crises, sanctions, expropriation, and territorial conflicts were selected for analysis from the ICSID and UNCITRAL databases to identify the common legal and procedural issues raised in ISDS mechanisms. The conclusions demonstrated that "legal uncertainty, procedural complexity, and enforcement issues in international investment arbitration systems are significantly exacerbated by geopolitical conflicts. The state necessity defense was subject to significant institutional flaws, with tribunals applying it differently in some cases and not in others, and with differing views on what constitutes sovereign immunity and investor protection. It also revealed that ICSID has stronger enforcement powers, while UNCITRAL has more procedural flexibility in politically charged cases. The study has established that it is imperative to undertake a major institutional upgrade of the existing ISDS models to maintain credibility and validity in the current uncertain geopolitical landscape. The research indicated the need for stronger treaty provisions, clearer procedures, greater transparency, and more crisis-sensitive appellate procedures within international investment arbitration systems.
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