AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RETHINKING ACCOUNTABILITY, DISTINCTION, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Abstract

The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into weapon system has facilitated the development of Autonomous Weapon System (AWS) capable of engaging and selecting the targets without real time control. This technological transformation challenges the human centered foundations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), particularly its reliance on the contextual assessment, human judgement and moral agency in the use of force. This paper critically evaluates the adequacy of existing IHL, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, in regulating AWS. It focuses on three principal legal challenges: the application of distinction and proportionality in autonomous targeting, the collapse of traditional command responsibility, and the emergence of an accountability gap arising from machine-mediated decision making.Using Pakistan as principal case study, the paper considers the risks associated with AWS in internal asymmetric conflicts, where the identification of combatants is already complicated by the presence of non-state actors within civilian populations. By engaging with Dr. Muhammad Asif Safdar’s framework in Legal Order of Internal Asymmetrical Warfare, ICRC policy developments and Pakistan’s diplomatic position within the United Nations Convention on the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) process, the study argues that although existing IHL is formally technology neutral, its current legal mechanisms may be insufficient to address the distinctive challenges posed by autonomous targeting. To address this gap, the paper proposes a two-track framework: an international protocol VI to the CCW mandating ‘meaningful human control’, alongside domestic legislative reforms in Pakistan to regulate the testing, deployment, and post-strike assessment of AI-enabled automated military capabilities. Without such measures, the increasing delegation of consequential targeting decisions to autonomous system risks creating significant gaps in legal responsibility and weakening the protective architecture of IHL in contemporary and future armed conflicts.